Linter Rule: Disallow unsafe ERB output inside <script> tags
Rule: erb-no-unsafe-script-interpolation
Description
ERB interpolation in <script> tags must use .to_json to safely serialize Ruby data into JavaScript. Without .to_json, user-controlled values can break out of string literals and execute arbitrary JavaScript.
This rule also detects usage of j() and escape_javascript() inside <script> tags and recommends .to_json instead, because j() is only safe when the output is placed inside quoted string literals, a subtle requirement that is easy to get wrong.
Rationale
The main goal of this rule is to assert that Ruby data translates into JavaScript data, but never becomes JavaScript code. ERB output inside <script> tags is interpolated directly into the JavaScript context. Without proper serialization, an attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript by manipulating the interpolated value.
For example, consider:
<script> var name = "<%= user.name %>";</script>If user.name contains "; alert(1); ", it renders as:
<script> var name = ""; alert(1); "";
</script>This is a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, as the attacker breaks out of the string literal and executes arbitrary JavaScript.
Using .to_json properly escapes the value and wraps it in quotes:
<script> var name = <%= user.name.to_json %>;
</script>With the same malicious input "; alert(1); ", .to_json safely renders:
<script> var name = "\"; alert(1); \"";
</script>The value stays contained as a string, and no code is executed.
Why not j() or escape_javascript()?
j() escapes characters special inside JavaScript string literals (quotes, newlines, etc.), but it does not produce a quoted value. This means it's only safe when wrapped in quotes.
This works, but is fragile. In this example safety depends on the surrounding quotes:
<script> var name = '<%= j user.name %>';</script>Without quotes, j() provides no protection and is UNSAFE, so code can still be injected:
<script> var name = <%= j user.name %>;</script>If user.name is alert(1), j() passes it through unchanged (no special characters to escape), rendering:
<script> var name = alert(1);
</script>This results in a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, as the attacker-controlled value is interpreted as JavaScript code rather than a string/data.
.to_json is safe in any position because it always produces a valid, quoted JavaScript value.
Examples
✅ Good
<script> var name = <%= user.name.to_json %>;
</script><script> var data = <%== config.to_json %>;
</script><script> <%= raw unsafe.to_json %>
</script>🚫 Bad
<script> var name = "<%= user.name %>";</script><script> if (a < 1) { <%= unsafe %> }</script><script> <%= @feature.html_safe %></script>⚠️ Prefer .to_json over j() / escape_javascript()
- const url = '<%= j @my_path %>';
+ const url = <%= @my_path.to_json %>;- const name = '<%= escape_javascript(user.name) %>';
+ const name = <%= user.name.to_json %>;